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ABSTRACT
There exists a derived negative right to procreative
freedom, including a right to in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and
to the exercise of selective techniques such as
preimplantation genetic diagnosis. This is an extensive
freedom, including not only the right to the exercise of a
responsible parenthood, but also, in rare cases, to wrong
decisions. It includes also a right for less than perfect
parents to the use of IVF, and for IVF doctors to assist
them, if they want and can agree about the terms.
Do we have a right to assisted reproduction? In
particular, do we have a right to in vitro fertilisa-
tion (IVF) treatment, irrespective of whether we
suffer from infertility? Yes, we do. In this paper I
will state the rationale behind this claim and also
indicate the scope and limits of it. In order to do
this, I will need to make some preliminary
distinctions. What does it mean to have a right in
the first place? I will distinguish between a view
where rights are seen as fundamental and a view
where they are seen as derived. I will defend the
view that they should be conceived of as derived. I
will also distinguish between positive and negative
rights. In the present context I will focus exclu-
sively on negative rights. After having made these
preliminary distinctions I will defend my claims
and delineate the rough contours of the scope and
limits of our right to IVF treatment.
BASIC VERSUS DERIVED RIGHTS
Some moral philosophers see morality as basically
constituted by rights. Their point of departure is
the idea that certain creatures, moral agents or
persons, own themselves. This is an idea of a moral
self-ownership, which implies that moral agents
have a basic moral right to dispose with themselves
as they see fit. They have a right to themselves.
This right to self-ownership is a basic moral
notion. There are obligations as well, according
to this view of morality, but these are derived from
the basic rights. You may do to yourself whatever
you like, but I am not allowed intentionally and
actively to interfere with you. I ought to abstain
from doing so. You may kill yourself, if you like,
and you may hire me to kill you, and I am then
allowed to kill you, but I am not allowed to kill
you against your wish. We may sum up this idea
thus: everyone is free to do as she sees fit with
herself, everyone is free to exercise her right to self-
ownership, but only to the extent that this does
not interfere with a similar right of everyone else.
Given this notion of a moral right we may
sometimes, when we state that it is wrong to do a
certain thing against a certain individual, come to
back up this claim with the moral claim that, to do
this against this individual, would be to violate this
individual’s basic right to self-ownership. The idea
of a moral right then appears in the premise of a
moral argument.
In the present context I will have none of this. I
do not believe that basic rights of this kind exist.
There are both moral and methodological problems
with the claim that they do exist that seem to me
to be insurmountable. The moral problems have to
do with the fact that, by respecting a putative basic
right to self-ownership, we may come to make the
world a much worse place. We may even come to
encounter situations where the number and
seriousness of rights-violations increase, just
because we hesitate to violate an individual right.
This is not acceptable from a moral point of view.
Furthermore, the moral rights theorists are at a loss
when we invite them to explain more exactly what
it means to be a moral agent, a person, a rights
bearer. And even if they were able, in the final
analysis, to answer this question in a satisfactory
manner (we would at least understand what they
are referring to), they would still be at a loss when
we ask them to explain why, from a moral point of
view, moral agents or persons are so special. Why
are they more important, in particular, from a
moral point of view, than other creatures capable
of feeling pain and pleasure? Lack of personhood
may be a good reason not to hold someone
responsible for her actions, but hardly a reason
not to grant her rights; that is, lack of personhood
is hardly a reason not to take the interests of
someone into moral consideration.
In the present context these observations must
suffice to set to one side the idea of moral rights as
basic. The important thing to note here is that,
even if we do not believe in basic moral rights of
this kind, there is yet plenty of room for moral
rights talk in our moral discourse. We may think of
moral rights as derived from basic consequentialist
(utilitarian) considerations. We may think of them
as legal claims that society ought (morally speaking)
to grant people. This is, for example, what J S Mill
has to say about rights:
When we call anything a person’s right, we
mean that he has a valid claim on society to
protect him in the possession of it, either by the
force of law, or by that of education and opinion ...
To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have
something which society ought to defend me in
the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask,
why it ought? I can give him no other reason than
general utility.
1
This Millean view of rights is the one I am going
to adopt in this paper. I elaborate on it elsewhere.
2
Note that on his view, the rights talk appears in
the conclusion of a moral argument rather than
among the premises of it.
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When rights are conceived of as basic it is common to see them
as merely negative. I have a negative right against everyone else
to exercise my right to self-ownership in the sense that no one
should actively and intentionally stop me from doing so, unless
by exercising my right I violate the right of anyone else. By
conceiving of them as negative we can ascertain that they do
not conflict. There is always of way of respecting all the rights
that exist. However, when rights are conceived of as derived it is
natural to make a distinction between positive and negative
rights. Negative rights can be conceived of in the manner
already indicated. I have a negative right to something such as
IVF treatment if society should see to it that no one actively and
intentionally stops me from accessing IVF treatment, if I seek
such treatment. And those who are willing to provide me with
this treatment, on the terms we have agreed upon, should be
allowed to do so. To have a positive right to IVF treatment
means that I have a negative right to it, but also something
more. It means that, not only should no one stop me from
accessing IVF treatment if I seek such treatment, I should also
be provided with such treatment, if I want it. For example, if
such treatment, when offered on the market, is too expensive
for me, then my use of it, if I want it, should somehow be
subsidised.
I believe we also have a positive right to IVF treatment hence
explained, but this is not the subject of this paper. I have argued
this point elsewhere.
3 Here I will focus on negative rights and
try to establish not only that such a negative right to the use of
IVF exists, but also that its scope is more far-reaching than has
sometimes been assumed.
A problem with positive rights is that they can conflict. A
further problem is that it is not always clear who has the
obligation to see to it that positive rights are fulfilled. These
problems are not insurmountable but they are genuine. It is
hence a nice aspect of negative rights that they can be devised
such that they do not conflict. There is always a way for
everyone to act such that no negative rights are being violated.
As was pointed out above, this is how those who conceive of
negative rights as basic, usually conceive of them. It is equally
natural, however, for those who conceive of negative rights as
derived from consequentialist considerations to see to it that
they do not conflict. Legislation in general, and legislation
granting negative rights of various kinds in particular, should be
free of practical inconsistencies. This means that when I claim
that we have a negative right to IVF treatment it is crucial for
me to see to it that the regulation of this right is devised in a
manner that does not mean that, when exercised, it comes to
violate important rights and interests of others. Let us now see
how all this applies to IVF.
A NEGATIVE RIGHT TO IVF TREATMENT
The ordinary purpose of an IVF treatment is to see to it that a
healthy and welcome baby is born. Even if, in our somewhat
perverted culture, killing, destruction and violent behaviour
seem to be held in high esteem and the rather mundane
procreative actions are rarely celebrated (at least if we set aside
the sexual act as such), these actions are good actions (in
general). Most people have children. In our ordinary lives, our
procreative actions are the best actions we ever perform. When
we are at our jobs, we can rarely, most of us, feel confident that
we make the world a better place. There is an exception from
this rule, of course. Those who work at IVF clinics are pure do-
gooders! Even if, otherwise, in our lives, we who are not
working at IVF clinics make little difference to the sum-total of
wellbeing in the universe, by having children we probably in
most cases make a difference, however, and a difference for the
better. This counts heavily in support of the claim that it is all
right to conceive and parent children. I would even go so far as
God does in Genesis, when he claims that we ought to replenish
the world. I have consistently argued for this claim over the
years,
45claiming that what Derek Parfit
6 has nick-named the
‘‘repugnant’’ conclusion is a misnomer. Be that as it may, in
most cases, when we have children, it is right to do so. This
seems to be accepted by Parfit in his ‘‘mere addition paradox’’,
6
where he takes for granted that by merely adding happy people
to the world we do not make the world a worse place. I assume
this means that it is all right to add happy people to the world.
But then society should at least grant us a negative right to
procreate.
Now, some people have fertility problems. They need to have
access to IVF in order to be able to have children. Society should
not stop them from doing so, since having children is, in most
cases, a good deed, this is true no less of people who use IVF. If
there is a difference, it probably counts in favour of those
dedicated parents who conceive with the aid of IVF.
This should suffice to grant that we have derived a negative
right to procreation in general and to the use, if necessary, of
IVF in particular. And if such a negative right exists, that is, if
society ought to grant it through suitable legislation, we can
also deduce as a corollary the right for anyone who wants to
assist people who seek IVF to do so. No one should be stopped
from either asking for IVF treatment or from providing such
treatment, on terms acceptable to both parties.
But how far should the negative right to IVF treatment be
extended? Are there crucial other interests involved, that might
provide a rationale for restricting somehow the right?
One may come to think here of the following interests: (i) the
interest of the prospective child, (ii) the interest of the world
(considering that negative rights are derived from consequenti-
alist considerations, and (iii) interests of people who are exposed
to prejudice in society (in particular, to disabled people).
I will discuss these three possibilities in order.
THE INTERESTS OF THE PROSPECTIVE CHILD
I have argued that, by conceiving and parenting children, in
ordinary circumstances, we make the world a better place. The
worst sin, the ultimate sin, I am prepared to add, would be if we
all abstained from having children, hence putting an end to
humanity. But even if this is true there are exceptional cases,
whereby having children we make the world a worse rather
than a better place. This can have something to do either with
problems pertaining to the children themselves, or to do with
our capacity or willingness for parenting. Are there not cases
where the child would be born to such a bad life that, in the
interest of the child, the access to IVF treatment should be
denied?
This argument presupposes that we can make predictions
about the future of the child. It is very difficult in many cases to
make such predictions. However, in some cases the predictions
may seem easy to make, so let us focus on those cases. Should at
least the access to IVF be denied in these cases?
Let us first consider cases where we know that the
prospective child runs a risk of being born to a terrible life due
to illness or handicap. Are there such cases? Yes, admittedly,
there exist a few such cases. I think of cases where a child is
born with a condition such as Krabbe’s disease. The child is
destined, because of its predictable genetic condition, to a short
and painful life. It is correct, in such cases to claim that, if such a
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conceiving such a child we wrong the child, I am prepared to
say. Some have denied this claim on the ground that it makes no
sense to compare existence to non-existence—see for example
David Heyd about this.
7 But we need not claim that there is a
fact of the matter as to how a not existing child would have
fared in order for the claim to make sense that an existing
individual would have been better off had he not existed. The
claim merely amounts to saying that life is bad for this child and
a world where this child, with her suffering, is missing, is in this
respect better than the existing world. And it is an existing child
who experiences the pain, that makes the difference between
these two worlds.
Does this mean that, if a couple runs the risk (25%) of having
a child with Krabbe’s disease, they should not be provided with
IVF?
This seems to be the wrong conclusion. We should rather
conclude that, if such a couple wants to conceive a child
through IVF, we should also offer them pre-implantation
genetic diagnosis (PGD). Then they can have a healthy child
without risking having a child with the terrible disease.
Does this mean that, if a couple who runs the risk of having a
child with Krabbe’s disease refuses to use PGD when conceiving
a child, they are acting irresponsibly?
It does indeed, or so I am prepared to argue. Does this also
mean that the use of PGD should be compulsory for the couple?
Otherwise IVF treatment will not be provided?
There are good reasons to draw this conclusion but, as we
will see, there are even stronger reasons against drawing it. I will
have to postpone the discussion about this until I consider the
interests of disabled people in relation to IVF and PGD
treatments.
Thus far we have just concluded that there are cases where it
is morally wrong to conceive children, when the matter is
assessed from the point of view of the prospective child. It is
wrong to conceive a child who is destined to a terrible life.
However, these cases are very rare. It is not plausible to claim,
for example, that a life with, say, Huntington chorea, is another
example of a life not worth living. A life with Huntington
chorea is a life with less happy life expectancy than a life
without the disease, but this does not mean that such a life
qualifies as a life not worth living. It is a life less worth living
than many lives—as a rough estimate we may claim that it
contains only half the sum-total of wellbeing characteristic of
an ordinary life—but yet, absolutely speaking, it could very well
be a good life.
But should not children be provided with something more
than a life just worth living? Are we not under an obligation to
see to it that the child as a chance to live an ordinary life, a life
beyond a reasonable ‘‘critical level’’? Is it not to wrong a child to
put it into existence, if its existence is below this level—even if
the child, when asked, is still pleased to be around?
This is a popular idea both in applied ethics
8 and population
ethics proper,
9 i but yet a false one. It leads to what Gustaf
Arrhenius has called the sadistic conclusion.
13 If it is morally bad
to create a happy individual, being just below the putative
critical level, then we must conclude that it is better to have a
world with one person who suffers terribly (who is well below
the line where life begins to be worth experiencing), than a
world with very many people leading lives worth living but
living just below the critical level. This is absurd. There are few
knock-down arguments in philosophy. This is one of them.
All this means that parents should be granted the use of IVF,
even when they run the risk of having children with terrible
diseases. If they do, they should also be offered PGD. This
means that we allow them to conceive children in a responsible
manner. I leave it for a separate section to discuss whether they
should also be required to use PGD, in order to obtain IVF
treatment, when facing risks such as these.
Now, if prospective parents, who run a risk of conceiving
children with terrible diseases, should be offered PGD, when,
because of fertility problems, they need to access IVF, it is also
very natural to extend their right to conceive children in a
responsible manner to a right to IVF treatment, even when they
have no fertility problem. They should be allowed to procreate
with the use of IVF in order to procreate in a responsible
manner. Of course, ordinary procreation and prenatal genetic
testing is also an alternative for them, but if they do not want
to risk several abortions, it may be preferable for them to seek
IVF and PGD. If they do, no one should stop them from doing
so.
Let us now focus on the prospective parents as such. Could
one make a case for the claim that the prospective parents are
not good enough to deserve the right to treatment? Having seen
that, in order to refuse treatment with respect to the right of the
prospective child, we must conclude that it is difficult to defend
this claim. In order to do so it is necessary to show that the life
of the child, if it is allowed to come into existence, is not worth
living. This is rarely the case, even with poor parents.
Poor parents may mean that a child has a worse life than it
would have had with better parents, but this is no option for
the IVF child. If we refuse to provide treatment to the couple
because we believe that they will become poor parents, this does
not mean that the same child will be born with better parents.
It means that it will not be born at all. And in most cases, even
when parenting is less than perfect, children are capable of
developing normally and eventually they will have lives well
worth living. And in the few cases where the parents are totally
incapable of parenting, society takes over and takes custody of
the child, who is provided either with foster parents or, in some
cases, is given away for adoption.
It is true that some children who have been placed in foster
homes or who have been given away for adoption lead lives not
worth living. Some of them kill themselves. However, this is the
exception. Most children in these categories live lives worth
living. It is impossible to predict who will be among the rare
cases where life will not be worth living. So we cannot deny IVF
treatment on the ground that the parents are not good enough.
Provided they are capable of following necessary medical advice
and to go through with the treatment, they have a right to do
so. At least there is no reason to deny them this right on the
ground that it is not in the best interest of their prospective
children to be born. The rationale behind this right is the same
as the rationale behind the right to conception in general, with
our without IVF. In most cases, conception results in an
additional happy life.
A comparison with adoption is here instructive. If a child has
been abandoned and is in need of parents who can adopt it, it
makes sense to claim that not just any couple is good enough.
We are here speaking of a child with special needs. It makes
sense to claim that only the best is good enough for this child.
The situation when a couple requests IVF services is different.
They have no child, yet. If they are denied the service, their
prospective child will never be born. Here we cannot say that
iThe idea has also been defended by Blackorby and colleagues,
10 and by Broome.
11 For
an introduction to the discussion see Arrhenius et al.
12
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parents. There are no putative alternative parents to compare
with. However, if it turns out that an IVF child, because its
parents do not take proper care of it, needs to be given away for
adoption, then, of course, only the best is good enough for this
child.
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE WORLD
We have seen that, if a child is born to a life worth living, then,
when it was allowed to be conceived, no rights possessed by it
have been violated. However, in some cases the prospective
parents face a choice. Either they conceive a child and run the
risk of conceiving a child with a disease that destines the child to
half a life rather than a full life, such as when the child is
inflicted with Huntington chorea. Now, if parents want to
conceive through IVF, even though they run a 50% risk of
conceiving a child with Huntington chorea, should they be
allowed to do so?
We have seen that, even if they conceive, and even if it
transpires that the child they have conceived has Huntington,
there is no reasonable complaint that could be made by their
child. It has a life worth living. Its life would have been better
for it, if it had not been inflicted with this disease, but this was
no option for this child. So no right of this child has been
violated when it was conceived. However, if the parents have an
option, either to conceive a child with Huntington, or a child
without Huntington, are they not under a moral obligation to
conceive a child without Huntington? And is this not perfectly
possible for them to do, if they resort to PGD?
I think parents who run a risk of having a child with a disease,
which lowers the expected value of the child’s life, have a moral
obligation to select a healthy child instead of the child they risk
to have. They are under a moral obligation to use PGD, then.
But how can this obligation be defended?
Obviously, it cannot be defended with the claim that, if they
have a healthy child rather than a sick child, there is someone
for whom this would be better. And still they have such an
obligation, I believe. And this has to do with the fact that, if
they have the healthy child, the world as such will be better.
When conceiving children, we ought to adopt a God’s eye view
of our choice. We ought to see it as a choice between possible
worlds, and we ought to opt for the best possible one among
those who are available to us.
Now, this conclusion cannot come as any surprise to any
utilitarian. This is what utilitarianism requires from us all the
time. And if rights are derived from consequentialist considera-
tions, it might then be tempting to argue, also, that not only
should parents who want to exercise their procreative rights in a
responsible manner be allowed to use PGD, but also that, unless
they do so, they should be denied access to IVF in the first place.
If they are not prepared to select against Huntington chorea,
then they should be denied access to IVF. However, there are
good reasons to resist this temptation, and in the final section of
this paper, to which I now turn, I will explain why.
DOES THE EXERCISING OF REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES POSE A
THREAT TO DISABLED PEOPLE?
I have argued that, not only are we under a moral obligation to
avoid, if possible, to conceive children who will live terrible lives,
lives not worth living, but that, furthermore, when we have a
choice, we ought to opt for those children, among all possible
children we can conceive, that will have the best chances to lead
a good life. All this means that it makes sense, not only to use
IVF when necessary, because we suffer from fertility problems,
but also to use it when we don’t, in order to be able to use
methods of selection such as PGD. But does not the use of our
right to choose children mean that the lives of people living
with various different disabilities are put at risk? Or, does it not
at least mean a threat against their self-esteem? In particular,
does it not mean that prejudice against people living with
disabilities will spread?
This concern is a serious and a genuine one. It should be taken
seriously. However, and alas, there is no ideal way of handling
it. Of course, if we could prohibit all kinds of use of techniques
rendering a selection of children to be born possible, we may
have obviated the threat felt by people living with diseases and
conditions selected against. However, this is neither a reason-
able nor a feasible strategy. It is unreasonable because it
requires, in rare cases, that responsible putative parents are not
allowed to behave in a moral manner; instead they are forced
into risking the birth of children who are destined to lives not
worth living. And it is not feasible since these techniques are
already with us, and a prohibition in one country would only
lead to medical tourism. How then, can we best handle the
concern, if not by prohibiting the selective techniques? Should
we regulate their use or should we allow that it be used as
prospective parents see fit? These seem to be the two remaining
options.
It is tempting to argue that, while some choices should be
allowed, others should be prohibited. Prospective parents should
not be allowed to choose the sex of their children, for example,
let alone, if it becomes possible, should they be allowed to
choose sexual orientation of their children. Why? Well, I
suppose the argument must be that it is no better to be born
with one sex rather than the other, or with one sexual
orientation, rather than the other.
However, if this is how society regulates the use of the
selection techniques society sends out a message. Partly, this
message is fine: there is no problem being female or gay.
However, when, at the same time, society allows for other
reproductive choices, such as a choice against a child with a
mental handicap (Down syndrome, say), it does send out a
rather nasty message. Down syndrome is indeed a problem!
This means that the Nazi spectre is once again alive.
So in order to avoid a situation where society has a view on
what kind of lives are worth living, we should allow the
prospective parents to exercise a complete freedom in this
respect. This means that, while some parents find, for example,
that a deaf child is just too much right now (they are not
prepared to migrate into another culture, which is alien to
them, they are not prepared to learn a new language, and so
forth), these parents are allowed to make a selection against
deafness; at the same time, another (deaf) couple may welcome
a deaf child; they are even free to make a selection in favour of
deafness.
Does this mean that many children will be born because of
immoral choices made by their parents? Does it mean that some
children will be born to lives not worth living? Will it mean that
some parents deliberately conceive children with less chances of
having full and happy lives than children with better chances?
To some extent, this is bound to happen. However, in most
cases prospective parents are very eager to see to their
prospective children’s best interest. So in most cases, procreative
freedom and a freedom to select will have good consequences.
And there is no guarantee that society will be successful, if,
instead, it takes over responsibility for these choices. And when
society goes wrong, it may go wrong on a large and terrifying
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medical authorities, or what have you) were more successful
than most prospective parents in making these decisions, which
I very much doubt that it would be, the very fact that we had
endowed society with the right to decide what sort of people
there should be would mean a serious threat to disabled people.
So we had better resist any temptation to adopt such eugenic
policies.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that there exists a derived negative right to
procreative freedom, including a right to IVF and to the exercise
of selective techniques such as PGD. This is an extensive
freedom, including not only the right to the exercise of a
responsible parenthood, but also, in rare cases, to wrong
decisions. It includes also a right for less than perfect parents
to the use of IVF, and for IVF doctors to assist them, if they
want and can agree about the terms.
The reason that we must accept a right to morally speaking
wrong decisions has to do with the fact that it is necessary to
stay clear of the kind of eugenics we are familiar with from the
recent past. Society should not hold any opinion about what
sort of people there should be.
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